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Abstract 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s Broadband Technology Opportunities Program 
(BTOP) spent $4.7B during 2009-2013 to, int. al, increase broadband adoption in underserved 
communities.   We characterize the BTOP grants and examine the impact of the awards on 
broadband adoption.  Econometric specifications controlling for award endogeneity related to 
observed and unobserved county-level factors find that spending is apparently associated with 
increased broadband adoption.  Further investigation, however, reveals that the impacts of 
spending are nonlinear and even nonmonotonic over the range of county-level BTOP spending in 
the data.  Controlling for trends to reduce the potential for spurious correlation between spending 
and outcomes removes most of the significance of the results.  We conclude with three lessons 







 I. Introduction 
In 2009, the United States federal government passed The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a stimulus act that comprised the immediate goals of creating and 
saving jobs and spurring economic activity while claiming to provide accountability and 
transparency in spending. Of the over $800 billion in stimulus funds, $7.2 billion was allocated 
for expanding access to broadband services throughout the nation (NTIA, 2011). There is a great 
deal of research showing that increases in broadband penetration are associated with increases in 
GDP, which provides a link between the broadband program and the government’s ultimate 
goals of the stimulus act.1   
Of the $7.2 billion allocated for broadband generally, Congress appropriated $4.7 billion 
for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to administer the 
Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP).2 The availability of BTOP funds was 
intended to increase broadband access and adoption rates among populations underrepresented 
with respect to broadband usage, such as minorities and low-income households, along with the 
larger goals of creating jobs and spurring economic growth.3 In this paper, we analyze one of the 
BTOP program outcomes by asking: did BTOP spending result in increased broadband 
adoption?   
By September 30, 2010, two rounds of applications and funding for BTOP were 
completed, and over $4 billion had been disbursed to 289 recipients proposing projects in four 
1 Gillett et al., (2006) and Katz and Suter, (2009) identified positive links between broadband deployment and 
economic prosperity. Scott (2012) similarly found that a 10% increase in broadband penetration is correlated with a 
1.35% increase in GDP for developing countries, and a 1.19% increase for developed countries. See also 
Koutroumpis (2009) and Qiang et al. (2009). 
2 NTIA is an executive branch agency under the U.S. Department of Commerce that advises the executive branch of 
the federal government on the telecommunications industry. The remaining $2.5 billion the ARRA allocated to 
broadband was to be distributed through the Rural Utilities Service (RUS).  
3 ASR (2012).  
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 categories: supporting communities’ efforts to sustain adoption of broadband service 
(“sustainable adoption,” 44 grants; $251 million), the deployment of broadband infrastructure 
(123 grants; $3,500 million), expanding public computer centers (66 grants; $201 million), and 
maintaining a nationwide public map of broadband service capacity and availability (56 grants – 
one per state, five U.S. territories, and Washington D.C.; $293 million) (NTIA 2014).4   
Applicants for BTOP funds were to describe fully their goals and implementation plans 
and to satisfy at least one of the statutory purposes,5 the most relevant of which for this 
investigation are to provide access to broadband service in unserved and underserved areas and 
to stimulate demand for broadband. 6  Funds awarded in the sustainable adoption category, to 
which we pay special attention below, could be used to deploy broadband‐related technology, 
digital literacy programs aimed at broadband usage, broadband-related education and outreach, 
and programs to provide potential users with greater access to broadband.7  Each BTOP 
applicant was expected to specify which of the federal goals and target groups the project would 
benefit.  Using each funded project’s application summary and quarterly reports, we created a 
dataset of all programs funded under both rounds of the program in 2009 and 2010.8  Details of 
the data are found in Section 3.   
4 Prior to implementation of the BTOP program, the government broadly determined funding priorities by 
specifying the total allocation of funds to be granted in each category. 
5 See NARA (2009).  For an excellent summary of the funding process see Rosston and Wallsten (2013).  
Broadband USA also offers documentation explaining the rules and processes of the BTOP program: 
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/.  Finally, the following NTIA website offers answers to frequently asked questions about 
BTOP: http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/files/nofa2_faqs_5_28_10.pdf. 
6 From BroadbandUSA Connecting America’s Communities, accessed August 17, 2014, at 
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/documents/BTOPPolicyReviewPPT.pdf. Unserved areas have less than 10% broadband 
penetration, and underserved areas have less than 40% penetration.  The other purposes of BTOP were to support 
the missions of schools, libraries, healthcare providers and public safety agencies with broadband access, training, 
and use.  
7 Eligible Costs for Sustainable Broadband Adoption, 74 Fed. Reg.33113 (July 9, 2009). 
8 Applications in Round 1 were accepted from July 14, 2009 to August 14, 2009.  Round 2 applications were 
accepted from February 16, 2010 to March 16, 2010, with the exception of an extension until March 26, 2010 for 
awards in the category of comprehensive community infrastructure.  
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 To analyze outcomes, we employ econometric models that relate broadband adoption 
before and after implementation to the amount of BTOP funding in the county.  Given the 
interval censored (i.e., ordinal categorical) nature of the observed dependent variable, fixed 
broadband lines per household in a county, we develop a novel adaptation of an estimation 
method for ordinal logit models with fixed effects.  Our adaptation, unlike existing methods, 
allows identification of the marginal effects in the scale of the latent continuous variable.  Thus, 
we are able to estimate the impact of BTOP spending on broadband penetration, even though the 
latter is only indirectly observed in the data.  Simple regression specifications find apparently 
significant impacts of the BTOP awards on broadband adoption.  However, estimations based 
upon more stringent econometric specifications (i.e., a higher bar for evidence of causality by 
accounting for trends) reveal that the marginal impacts of spending vary greatly at different 
spending levels and are far less certain than the simple specifications indicate. In fact, the impact 
of the stimulus spending on broadband adoption may well be zero, at least across most of the 
range of spending. 
Historically, relatively few analyses have measured actual program outcomes from 
broadband and other Internet adoption programs (Hauge and Prieger, 2010); most evaluations 
focus only on program implementation.  For example, one might confirm that computers with 
Internet access were installed at a school, but find no assessment of whether students’ access to 
the Internet, grades, test scores, graduation rates, or future labor market outcomes improved as a 
result.9 Our work thus provides a valuable contribution to the literature on program effectiveness 
in the area of digital diffusion programs.  The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we 
provide a brief review of relevant literature.  Section III explains the data.  Section IV explains 
9 See Goolsbee and Guryan (2006) for a rare exception. 
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 the empirical method and Section V provides results.  Section 0 offers policy implications and 
the conclusion.  
II. Literature 
There are huge literatures—largely separate—on outcomes from government spending 
and the determinants of broadband deployment and adoption. We constrain our review to those 
works that seek to determine program outcomes, and highlight research that considers the direct 
and indirect effects of spending or other factors driving broadband adoption.  With broadband 
infrastructure of some form now reaching nearly all the population, cost might be deemed the 
next critical barrier to adoption. However, according to the FCC’s “Broadband Adoption and 
Use in America” (Horrigan, 2010), only 36 percent of non-adopters cite cost as the main reason 
they do not have broadband at home. This means the majority of non-adopters cite other factors 
for not adopting. For example, 22 percent of non-adopters cited digital illiteracy as a factor and 
19 percent cited lack of relevance. If it is important to increase digital literacy and the perceived 
relevance of broadband and the Internet, then a multi-faceted approach to increasing broadband 
adoption is appropriate.  In prior work (Hauge and Prieger, 2010), we reviewed both supply-side 
(infrastructure) and demand-side (adoption and use) programs and the few available subsequent 
analyses of such programs.  We noted that “Encouraging broadband adoption is only part of a 
larger digital literacy effort, and programs work when they make non-users want to connect, 
make the Internet cheaper and easier to use, and adjust to users’ preferences” [page 1].  Turner-
Lee and Gant (2010) affirm our assertion and suggest that policy should focus on the perceptions 
and behaviors of broadband consumers to encourage increased adoption and usage. Their paper 
offers a survey of the existing evidence regarding the acceptance of broadband given 
affordability, availability, and accessibility.  Turner-Lee and Gant cite the expected performance 
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 of broadband and the time, energy, and social aspects of adoption as driving forces behind such 
adoption.  They do not, however, examine the impact of public computing centers or sustainable 
adoption programs on adoption.   
Some research focuses on communities which lag in broadband adoption and examine 
barriers to use.  Gant et al. (2010) use data from the National Minority Broadband Adoption 
Study conducted in 2009 and 2010, and present evidence on white, black, and Hispanic 
broadband adoption and usage, concluding that the value of adoption is not seen equally across 
races and ethnicities.  Similarly, Horrigan and Satterwhite (2010) suggest that broadband 
adoption requires three “pillars”: infrastructure, sustained innovation (that results in lower costs 
and improvements in usability), and a network of social support for potential users.  Horrigan 
and Satterwhite focus on the last of these pillars, and argue that policymakers must understand 
that the social infrastructure around non-adopters is crucial to drawing them to sustained and 
meaningful Internet use.  The primary method for such encouragement is providing support at a 
local level that focuses on education of non-adopters so that they become comfortable with 
technological innovations, and so that a culture of use is promoted. Similarly, Prieger 
(forthcoming) notes that the differences in usage rates (generally) are statistically significant and 
reveal large adoption gaps by race and ethnicity that do not appear to be caused by lack of access 
to broadband.  Interestingly, the racial gaps for blacks do not persist when considering mobile 
broadband. 
Finally, Peronard and Flemming (2011) cite the lack of relevant content as reason for 
non-adoption, and suggests that encouraging more appropriate content may be optimal for 
increasing adoption.10   He points out that there is a need for “an enriched theoretical approach 
aimed at empirically examining the relationship between broadband adoption and the 
10 See also: Firth and Mellor, 2005; Papacharissi and Zaks, 2006; Preston, Cawley, and Metykova, 2007. 
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 interpretation of causes and effects” (page 692).  These papers present the state of affairs, and 
together suggest that the inclusion of public computing center grants and sustainable adoption 
grants are likely to be effective if they target non-adopting communities, but the research fails to 
link such programs to increased adoption.   
In addition to more general research on broadband adoption, some recent research 
specifically addresses BTOP as part of the ARRA.  Many such papers report negative findings. 
Gimpel et al. (2013) state that the geographic distribution of funds was poorly mismatched with 
needs, therefore resulting in the lack of success of the program.  Rosston and Wallsten (2013) 
echo this conclusion calling the program’s allocation of funds inefficient, and later in Wallsten 
and Rosston (2013) calling the program a “rural boondoggle”.  Given their early date, none of 
these works considered the intended outcomes of the various programs; rather, they analyzed the 
distribution of funds and its efficiency and apparent equity.  In another paper, Jackson and 
Gordon (2011) studied 27 projects that engaged in BTOP and the Broadband Initiatives Program. 
They found examples of difficulties and also of successes and from these projects offer lessons 
for future publicly funded programs. 
Jayakar and Park (2012) offer a thorough study of factors likely to lead to the success of 
Public Computer Center (PCC) grants.  They note that the BTOP required PCC projects to 
specify the degree of accessibility of the planned PCC to the public and to verify the technical 
feasibility of the project.  The authors suggest that the demand characteristics of the community 
would allow better prediction of the anticipated success of PCCs, and therefore allow for more 
efficient distribution of funds, but that the BTOP grant process did not incorporate these 
considerations.  In contrast to their earlier, prospective work, the same authors subsequently 
(Park and Jayakar, 2013), analyze empirically the distribution of BTOP PCC funds and find that 
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 money went to areas of pre-existing high broadband availability and demand, contrary to the 
BTOP’s goals. Nevertheless, they conclude that this pattern of funding is cost-efficient.   
Perhaps closest to our work in this respect is that by LaRose et al. (2014), who provide an 
excellent overview of the BTOP applicants and funds distributed, and emphasize that the main 
empirical studies in the U.S. are correlational and as such, offer limited evidence of the causal 
impacts of broadband investment, and even less the effects of public investment. While they 
utilize a database similar to that which we have amassed, they did not include an empirical 
evaluation as BTOP projects were not scheduled to be completed until the end of 2012 (with 
possible extensions through the end of 2013).  This small subset of projects, however, does little 
to inform the overall analysis is BTOP program outcomes.   
While we have not found prior research indicating that public computer centers or 
sustainable adoption programs have increased broadband adoption, we do find that certain 
factors have proven to be successful in increasing adoption.  For example, Prieger (forthcoming) 
shows that mobile broadband may be successful in connecting minority communities to the 
Internet where they live. In a 2006 paper, Glass (2006) found that adoption rates for Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL) services in rural areas increase significantly once video is added to the 
service bundle. Subsequently, Glass and Stefanova (2010) show that policies that lower the cost 
of providing video may stimulate broadband adoption. Other important drivers of adoption are 
content on the Internet (Howell, 2002), specifically home entertainment in general (Choudrie and 
Dwivedi, 2006) and applications such as downloading music and online purchasing (Kolko, 
2010) in specific.  
The Office of Management and Budget states that an appropriate evaluation of a federal 
project such as BTOP should assess whether implementing the program resulted in its intended 
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 results for its intended beneficiaries (OMB, 2009).  Clearly it is easier to determine progress 
towards project execution than to determine the effects of implemented projects.  Regardless, 
projects should be designed to have real impacts on participants, and potential impacts should be 
verified empirically using convincing econometric methods to establish causal relationships. 
Therefore, in this paper we focus on the effects on broadband adoption of projects funded by 
BTOP. The success of specific demand-side programs designed to encourage broadband 
adoption remains largely unproven in the literature (Hauge and Prieger, 2010). For this reason, 
our attempt to discern the outcome of BTOP program funding represents an important 
contribution to the literature.  
III. Research questions and associated data 
To determine program outcomes, we started by categorizing projects by the claimed 
outcomes in the applications.  We included all applicants classified by project category; type of 
applicant (e.g., a city, private company, or university); the location of both the applicant and the 
proposed project’s targeted recipient(s); characteristics of each project’s targeted group(s) (e.g., 
Native American, disabled, or veteran); and the stated goal(s) of the project (e.g. , digital 
literacy, healthcare, or workforce development).11 We added the associated county-level socio-
demographic data for each project’s target area for analysis in this section. 
A BTOP grant may cover a single county, several counties, an entire state, areas of 
multiple states, or (in a few cases) the whole nation.  The econometric results in Section IV are 
based on the geography claimed as the intended recipient of the benefit of the grant.  For the key 
“treatment” variable for the estimations, we construct a county-level BTOP spending variable as 
11 Rosston and Wallsten attempted to obtain data directly from the NTIA but were given an estimated initial fee of 
$144,715.09 to process their data request; they concluded that “the NTIA does not make such information readily 
available.” (Rosston and Wallsten, 2013, footnote 10). 
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 follows.  First, the set of counties claimed to be benefited by each award was determined.  This 
step necessarily involved judgment in some cases, because the NTIA did not require applicants 
to be specific.12  Second, out of necessity the total award amount was split among associated 
counties proportionally to the numbers of households they contained.  While this assumption of 
uniform spending across the area of intended benefit is surely wrong, there are no consistent data 
in the applications to allow more refined allocations.  Thus, there is inescapably some 
measurement error in the key treatment variable, and we explore this in our robustness tests 
below.  Third, the spending per household was aggregated across all funded projects to arrive at 
the total BTOP award amount per household for each county in the nation.  Funding in aggregate 
for the county ranges from $0.71 per household (those counties only covered by the three 
nationwide projects) to $5,049 per household.  Average spending is $55 and median spending is 
$22.   The distribution of the log of this variable is shown in Figure 1.13   
Table 1 provides details on the type of applicants across BTOP categories. Private entities 
(listed as “Others” in the table), including both non-profit and for-profit organizations compose 
the majority (52.8 percent) of applicants, receiving just under half of all funds disbursed (48.4 
percent). States, tribal applicants, and universities were better able to secure funding than each of 
the other applicant types: their percentage point difference in total applications funded less total 
applications were 14.7, 0.5, and 0.01, respectively.  Cities (-8.2 percentage point difference 
between applications and funded projects), Other (-4.3), and Libraries (-2.1) were least 
successful.  While this result indicates tribal lands were recognized as a target group as specified 
12 Examples of judgment include matching statements such as “rural New Mexico” to noncore RUPRI counties and 
“south central rural North Dakota” to non-CBSA counties in the south central part of the state. 
13 Logging the variable reduces greatly the skewness in the spending levels, but the inherent bimodality remains.  
While bimodality does not, in principle, render the spending variable unsuitable for use as a regressor, it does lead 




                                                 
 by BTOP goals, it also suggests local applicants were less successful than might be ideal given 
the BTOP’s emphasis on local community driven programs. 14      
In Table 2, we differentiate between applications designed to provide programs within a 
single county and those covering multiple counties, including state-wide, multi-state, and 
national programs.  We find that multi-county programs (i.e. those of larger geographic scope) 
were more successful at securing funding than programs designed to serve a single county. This 
seems counter to BTOP’s emphasis on the importance of community support and community 
anchor institutions, and runs counter to the notion that local level programs are likely to have 
greater demand-side impact on unserved and underserved communities than non-local programs. 
Next, we quantified the frequency with which stated program targets were cited in 
applications.  To do this, we recorded any statement in an application referencing aid to the 
various groups BTOP was designed to help.  The frequencies of citations of these BTOP target 
groups are shown in Table 3.  We note the importance of digital literacy and workforce 
development as demand-side programs, and the importance of mapping for entities to determine 
infrastructure needs.  Similar analysis for the category of the proposal is in Table 4. Note that 
while Infrastructure proposals were not the majority category by number of proposals, such 
proposals were most often funded and received the most money.  Public Computer Center and 
Sustainable Adoption proposals were funded at a lower rate.  Since Sustainable Adoption 
projects were aimed specifically at increasing broadband adoption, we examine this category by 
itself in the empirical work below.  The distribution of spending in the Sustainable Adoption 
category is shown in Figure 2.  About 45% of counties received no specific BTOP funding in this 
14 In the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program Frequently Asked Questions (May 28, 2010, page 10), it is 
stated that “Proposals that would benefit tribal entities receive extra consideration by the program during review, 




                                                 
 category apart from the single nationwide award (which contributed $0.13 per household to each 
county).  Another 22% of counties each received $0.58 per household, the sum of the nationwide 
and a single large multistate grant.  The average Sustainable Adoption funding per household is 
$1.82, the median is $0.58, and the maximum is $240. 
Did groups most in need, termed “unrepresented and underrepresented” in the BTOP 
guidelines, apply for and receive funding commensurate with those needs?  We cannot determine 
why some (statistically) needy communities did not apply for funding, but we can compare the 
size of BTOP target subpopulations in counties with applications and counties covered by no 
application.   Since technically all counties are covered by statewide and(the few nationwide 
projects, only applications targeting specific counties are included in these statistics.  The left 
side of Table 5 summarizes these data using the proportion of the county population composed 
by various socio-demographic characteristics.  The proportions are first calculated with simple 
and population-weighted averages.  The table shows, for example, that in counties specifically 
covered by at least one BTOP application, blacks compose an average of 10.2% of the 
population (see column one), while in other counties blacks make up 4.4% of the population 
(column three).  The population weighted figures, 13.6% vs. 7.2%, show that subpopulation from 
counties appearing in applications has a higher proportion of blacks than does the subpopulation 
from counties not covered by an specific application.  For a different comparison, column two of  
Table 5 reports an application-weighted version of the figures, so that a county covered by n 
applications receives n times as much weight in the averages.  The application-weighted 
proportion of blacks in applicant counties is even higher than the previous figures from column 
one, implying that not only were minority-heavy counties targeted by applications, they also 
received coverage under more applications.  The same is true, to different degrees, for Hispanics 
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 and Asians, but not for Native Americans, the disabled, veterans, or senior citizens. This 
suggests that some of the populations most in need (but not all) were more likely to apply for 
funding, in accordance with BTOP goals. 
The last two columns of Table 5 show, for the subset of counties covered by an 
application, a comparison of demographics when applications were funded versus denied.  When 
there are material differences in the demographics between these groups of counties, as there are 
for blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and possibly American Indians, they are in the direction of 
favoring applications covering more minorities. Because these minorities (apart from Asians) are 
typically underrepresented among broadband users,15 these results suggest that funding, 
generally speaking, was allocated according to BTOP goals of serving those populations most 
underrepresented in terms of broadband.   
How should we expect BTOP spending to stimulate broadband adoption?  At one end of 
the black box, money is spent on programs with various BTOP goals.  At the other end is the 
potential for increased broadband adoption (as well as the other BTOP targets not examined 
here).  There are many mechanisms, direct and indirect, by which spending on broadband 
programs may lead to adoption.   Sustainable adoption projects, by definition and goal, should 
have a direct impact on adoption.  Infrastructure projects have indirect effects on demand 
through the supply side, to the extent that new areas gain access to broadband (or to higher 
quality or lower price broadband).  Finally, spending on any type of project may have indirect 
effects on broadband adoption through many channels:  demand-side externalities through 
15 In July 2011, 71% of non-Hispanic whites and 72% of Asians used the Internet at home, but only 52% of blacks 
and 49% of Hispanics did.  Another way to examine broadband availability for minorities is to compare the number 
of residential broadband providers available to a representative member of each racial or ethnic group. Sixty-four% 
of white non-Hispanics have the greatest chance of having four or more fixed broadband providers where they live. 
Blacks have the lowest similar probability, at 46%, followed by Asians and Pacific Islanders (49%) and Hispanics 
(53%) (all statistics from Prieger (forthcoming)). 
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 network effects, demand stimulation from being introduced to broadband through a public 
computer center or digital literacy project, market externalities stemming from increased 
competition or lowered prices prompted by BTOP activity, or other supply-side externalities 
(e.g., high participation in a BTOP sustainable adoption project may prompt existing broadband 
providers to market more attentively and attractively to the target population).  We do not seek to 
disentangle these mechanisms, but instead look for whether the total effect through all channels 
is large enough to be measureable.  Given the special connection between sustainable adoption 
projects and broadband adoption, however, we do examine sustainable adoption spending by 
itself in some estimations. 
The specific outcome we consider is fixed residential broadband connections per 100 
households (RFC/HH).   “Broadband” is defined two ways:  by the FCC definition of at least 200 
kbps in at least one direction; or, by the BTOP definition of at least 768 kbps downstream and 
greater than 200 kbps upstream.  The latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is not observed; instead, categorical 
variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0,1,…,5 is observed.  The categories are defined as in Table 6. Summary statistics 
of these outcomes and the BTOP spending variables are shown in Table 7. 
IV. Empirical methods 
The years of data included in the estimations are 2009, before the programs were funded, 
and 2013, after funding and implementation.  Let Git be the BTOP log award size per household 
in county i and year t, where award dollars have been aggregated to the county level as described 
in the previous section.  Treatment variable Git will be defined variously as total spending, 
spending allocated to Sustainable Adoption grants, and spending allocated to awards in 
categories other than Sustainable Adoption.  Let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  be the outcome of interest, RFC/HH, 
measured midyear for 2009.  For 2013, the FCC version of RFC/HH is measured at year end, 
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 while the BTOP version is measured at the beginning of the year (the latest available).16   For Git, 
it is assumed (in accord with program start dates) that no money is spent as of Q1 2009 and all 
money is spent as of the end of 2013, although some projects from round two of the funding had 
not finished as of that date.17  Additionally, because some broadband and economic data for 2014 
is not yet available, 2013 makes a natural ending date for us in any event.  So Git = 0 for 2009 
and Git for 2013 is the full amount awarded. We present several models for assessing the 
association between local BTOP spending and outcomes, proceeding from simple to more 
complex specifications. 
Each specification for the latent variable is of the general linear form 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
or 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where xi is a vector of variables (including a constant) for the economic and demographic 
characteristics of the county at the start of our study period, 2009;18 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a county-specific term 
incorporating all time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a mean-zero 
error term following the logistic distribution with scale parameter σ, possibly correlated across t 
within the same county.  The term 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 subsumes factors related to the endogeneity of G due to 
selection bias in the awarding of BTOP money. Furthermore, note that the county-specific 
intercept also includes factors such as the economic growth or change in broadband usage in the 
county, expected as of 2009, which also may be related to the distribution of the BTOP awards.  
16 The RFC/HH data using the BTOP definition are unavailable after December 31, 2012 due to a change in data 
collection at the FCC.   
17 By December 2013, 192 projects (86% of all) had been completed (according to NTIA’s 20th Quarterly Status 
Report, issued June 26, 2014).  The remaining 32 projects in progress had received an unspecified extended award 
period.  
18 Given our short period under study, how slowly demographics typically evolve, and our inclusion of county fixed 
effects in the estimations, we will not worry about year-specific demographic covariates.  
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 Terms 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and β are not separately identifiable, which is why only one of these will appear in any 
particular regression.  We also allow for nonlinearity in the impact of BTOP spending on RFC 
and control for national trends by examining the following additional specification,  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
where f is a nonlinear function of G and τ is a year fixed effect.  We estimate f with a flexible 
curve-fitting method, restricted cubic splines.19 The addition of the trend to the specification 
implies that identification of the impact of spending comes from increases in spending and 
broadband adoption that are net of national trends.  Controlling for trends may be important in 
this application because both G and y trend upward. 
Since latent variable 𝑦𝑦∗ is unobserved, we estimate the unknown parameters of the model 
by maximum likelihood (MLE).  The relationship between the latent and observed variables is 
shown in Figure 3.20  In equation (1), the parameters (𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾,𝜎𝜎) are identifiable with MLE.21  We 
use the Baetschmann (2012) extension to Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann’s (2011) “blow 
up and cluster” (BUC) method for fixed effects ordered logit to account for the fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 in 
equations (2) and (3). In the BUC method, the dependent variable is converted to a set of 
dichotomous dependent variables, and conditional logit regression is then used to estimate the 
slope coefficients.  Baetschmann (2012) showed how BUC can be extended to identify the 
ordered logit cutpoints in addition.  Finally, in the appendix we show how these methods, 
19 Restricted cubic splines (Harrell, 2001) result in an estimated continuous and differentiable f that is linear before 
the first knot and after the last knot, and is a piecewise cubic polynomial between adjacent knots.  
20 The figure reveals that we have made a slight simplification in identifying y* with RFC/HH.  Latent y* takes 
values on the real line, while actual RFC/HH cannot be negative (although it could, in principle, exceed 100).  A 
more pedantic exposition would define the latent variable y** to take values on the real line, then define y* = 
RFC/HH to be a left censored version of y* a la the Tobit model, and then finally to define y as the categorical 
observed variable.  For our purposes, the only thing that matters, however, is that y* as we have defined it has units 
on the appropriate scale of RFC/HH. 
21 We estimate the model using constrained ordered logit estimation, as described in the appendix.  In ordered 
logistic regression, the scale parameter σ is not identified separately from the coefficients and the cutpoints, but here 
σ and the constant in β are identified because the cutpoints are known (see Figure 3). 
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 combined with our knowledge of the location of the actual cutpoints, can be used to identify the 
scale of the logistic error term.  With the variance of the logistic error term estimated, we can 
then estimate the marginal effects in the natural scale of RFC/HH.  In particular, the marginal 
effects will correspond to changes in residential broadband lines per hundred households.  To 
account for correlation over time among the error terms from the same county, we estimate all 
standard errors using a cluster-robust estimator. 
V. Results 
This section contains the estimation results and the implied marginal effects of the BTOP 
spending.  Using data on all funded projects,  we begin with a simple linear specification, add 
county fixed effects to control for selection bias, demonstrate the need to allow for nonlinear 
impacts of spending, and finally estimate the model accounting for time trends. 
A. Linear Specifications 
The results for the regression specification based on equation (1) are in Table 8. Each 
column in the table is for a regression with the dependent variable RFC/HH defined with the 
definition of broadband as given in the column heading.  The first pair of columns is for the 
impact of total BTOP spending, while the last two columns are for sustainable adoption spending 
only.  Given the log form of the spending variable Gi, the coefficient on spending, γ, is 100 times 
the marginal effect on RFC/HH (on a 100 point scale) of a 1% increase in the BTOP award per 
household in the county.  Thus the estimated coefficient of spending of 2.6 in column one of 
Table 8, for the FCC definition of broadband, implies that a 1% increase in total BTOP spending 
is associated with increased broadband adoption of 0.026 (i.e., an additional 0.026 connections 
per 100 households).  The marginal effects using the BTOP definition of broadband RFC/HH is a 
bit larger (2.92) and is also statistically significant.  In general, across all our regressions the 
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 marginal effects are typically (but not always) slightly larger for the BTOP version of the 
dependent variable but—importantly—do not have higher significance levels (compared to the 
FCC version of y).  With that in mind, and given that the FCC-defined data are available for 
longer than are the BTOP-defined data, we will not discuss explicitly the results for the BTOP 
definition of RFC/HH below. 
While the covariates added to the regressions are included only to control for omitted 
variable bias in the impacts of BTOP spending, it is interesting to note that many of their 
coefficients are significant, and in the direction typically found in other studies of broadband 
penetration, diffusion, and adoption (e.g., Chaudhuri, et al., 2005; Prieger and Hu, 2008).  
Counties with more people and business establishments, counties with a lower proportion of non-
Asian minorities, and higher proportions of Asian minorities, more educated residents, and 
higher-income households generally have higher predicted RFC/HH (although the impact of 
income and education are not monotone).  The only unexpected result is that counties with more 
senior citizens have higher broadband penetration.22  
The coefficients on spending from BTOP awards that target sustainable adoption, in 
columns three and four of Table 8, are higher than those for total spending.  This is as expected, 
since not all BTOP spending is aimed specifically at increasing home adoption of broadband.   
The estimates of the impact of spending from equation (1) may be biased if awards were 
granted to counties based on their prospects for growth in broadband adoption.  We may 
naturally expect that selection bias would attenuate the estimated impact of spending (or even 
reverse it) if more money was awarded to counties with dimmer prospects for increased adoption 
in the absence of the awards.  However, other work suggests that money was steered toward 
22 In July 2011, 69.9% of those between the ages of 18 and 64 used broadband Internet at home, while only 39.7% 
of senior citizens used broadband (computations by the authors using the Computer and Internet Use Supplement to 
the Current Population Survey). 
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 counties with influential representatives in Congress (Hauge, 2015) and relatively favorable 
conditions for broadband adoption (Park and Jayakar, 2013).  Thus, in principle, the bias may be 
in either direction. Adding county fixed effects, as in equation (2), and estimating via the BUC 
method removes selection bias from the estimate of γ.   
The results from estimations based on equation (2) are in the first six columns of Table 9.  
Again we examine total (columns 1 and 2) and sustainable adoption spending (columns 3 and 4) 
in separate regressions, and also split total spending into sustainable adoption and other spending 
in the final pair of regressions (columns 5 and 6).  Compared to the estimates in Table 8, adding 
the fixed effects increases the coefficients on total and sustainable adoption spending in the first 
four columns of Table 9.  The increase is largest for the sustainable adoption coefficient, which 
increases from 3.7 to 4.9 (for the FCC definition of the dependent variable).  Thus selection bias 
appears to have attenuated the marginal effects in the previous regressions.  Even so, the 
marginal effects are not large; a 10% increase in total spending would move the needle for 
RFC/HH less than a third of a broadband connection.  The coefficients fall when both sustainable 
adoption and other spending are included in the same regression (columns 5 and 6 of Table 9), 
but all are still significant. 
In summary, the results from this section show that the BTOP spending is apparently 
statistically significantly associated with broadband adoption, assuming that a linear-log 
regression specification is correct.  However, these results are not definitive—and we make no 
claim regarding causality—because there may be additional nonlinearity in the marginal effect of 
BTOP spending, and some of the positive association between G and y may come from spurious 
correlation between trending variables.  We investigate these issues in the following sections. 
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 B. Nonlinearity in the effect of BTOP spending 
Turn now to equation (3), where spending variable G enters the specification for the 
mean outcome in a nonlinear fashion.  We at first set aside the time trends, taking τ to be zero in 
equation (3).  The results of the interval censored logistic estimation via the BUC method, where 
nonlinear function f(G) is estimated with restricted cubic splines, are in the first two columns 
each of Table 10 and Table 11.  The general significance of the spline variables 2 through 6, 
which allow for the nonlinearity in f, provides evidence that constraining the impact of G to be 
linear is incorrect.   
The slope of f is the marginal impact of log spending.  The nonlinearity and 
nonmonotonicity between spending and adoption outcomes is clearly seen in Figure 4 (for total 
spending) and Figure 5 (for sustainable adoption spending).  If a linear specification as in 
regression specifications (1) and (2) were correct, the plotted lines would be horizontal.  The 
estimated marginal effects lead to several conclusions.  First, the confidence bands for the 
marginal effects do not span zero in most places, indicating apparent statistically significant 
association between spending and RFC/HH remains at most spending levels. Second, the 
marginal effect is not always positive. At medium and the highest levels of total spending, there 
is significant negative association between spending and adoption.  The same is true for medium 
levels of sustainable adoption spending.  Third, the marginal effect is not monotone; there is 
substantial nonmonotonicity in f. 
C. Accounting for time trends 
We now turn to the full regression specification based on equation (3) including the trend term.  
Inclusion of the trend along with the fixed effects implies that identification of γ comes from 
variation in the increase in adoption and spending that is net of the average increases.   
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 This specification removes omitted variable bias potentially caused by spurious correlation 
between the trending dependent variable and BTOP spending.  The former has a positive trend 
since broadband adoption, however measured, has steadily increased since the FCC first began to 
measure it in 1999.  The latter has a positive trend because BTOP spending is zero in every 
county in 2009 and positive everywhere in 2013 (since there were a few nationwide projects that 
contributed at least a little spending to each county). This specification sets the highest bar for 
convincing evidence that BTOP spending causally affected adoption. The disadvantage of this 
specification is that controlling for trends necessarily removes some of the variation in the data, 
not all of which necessarily contributes to spurious correlation between spending and adoption. 
Thus, while this specification yields regression results that are least likely to be afflicted with 
spurious correlation, they are not necessarily the “best” estimates.   
The estimation results for the flexible, nonlinear parameterization of the spending 
impacts are in the last two columns each of Table 10 and Table 11, and the marginal effects are 
plotted in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Comparing the marginal effects of total spending with and 
without the trend in Figure 4 and Figure 6, it is apparent that the greatest difference is the wider 
confidence band when the trend is included.  For the FCC definition of broadband, spending has 
a positive, significant impact on broadband adoption only for low levels of spending (up to about 
1 log dollar) and in a middle range (roughly between 2 and 3 log dollars).  Elsewhere the 
marginal effects are insignificant or (in a narrow range from roughly 3.4 to 4 log dollars) 
significantly negative.  For the BTOP definition of broadband, spending has a positive, 
significant impact on broadband adoption only for a middle range, roughly between 2 and 3 log 
dollars.  The impact of spending beyond that level turns negative.  For sustainable adoption 
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 spending, the marginal effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero for all levels of 
spending, for both definitions of broadband. 
The conclusion that controlling for trends removes most or all of the apparent positive 
association between BTOP spending and broadband adoption does not depend on the 
nonlinearity in G allowed by equation (3).  Adding a trend to any of the previous linear 
specifications based on equation (2) results in either lack of significance of the spending 
coefficient or, in the case of the FCC definition of broadband regressed on total spending, a 
significant negative coefficient.  As an example, the estimates for sustainable adoption spending 
with trend are in the last two columns of Table 9. 
D. Robustness Checks 
To bolster the strength of the findings above, we report the results of several additional 
estimations in this section.  For the first test of the robustness of the results, the spending variable 
G is changed to be BTOP awarded amounts per capita, instead of per household. The estimated 
spending coefficient γ with the new definition of G is very similar to the results above in each 
Table (almost always to the first or second decimal place).  The nonlinear marginal effects are 
also virtually identical to those in Figure 4 through Figure 7. For the second robustness check, 
the estimations are weighted by the number of households in the county.  The size of the 
coefficients rises (results not reported), but the significance levels and therefore our conclusions 
do not change.  For the third robustness check, we dropped observations for Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Washington, D.C., the former two because they may have unique challenges for broadband 
diffusion and the latter because its governance structure differs from a state.  Again, the changes 
in coefficients, marginal effects, and significance levels were trivial.  
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 In a fourth set of regressions, the regression in the final two columns of Table 9 is 
estimated with spending in the Infrastructure category replacing spending in categories other 
than Sustainable Adoption (see Table 12).  Since most spending is in the Infrastructure category, 
the difference between the two definitions is not great.  Nevertheless, the size of the coefficients 
on Sustainable Adoption spending changed markedly, both in regressions with and without the 
residual “other spending” category.  From these results we draw two conclusions.  The apparent 
statistical significance of Sustainable Adoption spending does not depend on how total spending 
is categorized (although the magnitude of the apparent impact changes). Furthermore, the 
instability of the spending coefficients with regard to the set of spending variables included 
provides further evidence for the results being driven by spurious correlation among trending 
variables. This provides further support for the inclusion of controls for trends in the regressions. 
Another way to categorize BTOP awardees is by whether the recipient was a government 
entity.  In the fifth robustness test, we split total spending into amounts awarded to state, local, 
and county governments and other recipients. The latter category includes private entities, 
libraries, universities, and the few tribal awards granted. Since there is much evidence that 
management by government leads to less efficient outcomes than when markets discipline the 
managers, a dollar spent by a government may accomplish less of BTOP’s goals than a dollar 
spent by other entities.23  On the other hand, most (roughly two-thirds) of the awardees from the 
private sector were nonprofits, which also may be largely shielded from market discipline, 
particularly when spending money that is granted to them.24  Thus we have no clear a priori 
expectation of whether there will be a difference in the impact of spending by government versus 
23 Ros (1999) finds that publicly owned telecommunications firms had lower labor productivity than privately 
owned firms.  For other industries, Megginson and Netter’s (2001, p.380) survey article concludes that the body of 
research “supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient” than state owned firms. 
24 There are likely to be deficient incentives for managers of nonprofits, since managers cannot legally share in the 
surplus their decisions may create (see Weisbrod (1988) and citations therein).   
22 
 
                                                 
 other entities. In linear specifications, whether year fixed effects are included or not, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the spending by the two groups are the same. 
For the sixth alternative approach, we remove from the sample any award that required 
judgment in assigned spending to counties.  As explained in Section III, many grant applications 
were vague concerning the affected geography.  This removes 535 county/award observations 
out of the total of 19,383.25  The regressions with the linear specifications yield similar results to 
the main estimations. However, the nonlinear specifications return marginal effects that are 
statistically insignificant over even larger ranges of spending.  Figure 8 shows the marginal 
effects for total spending from this sample.  For almost all spending above de minimis levels, the 
marginal effect is insignificant.  When trends are controlled for, in Figure 9, the marginal effects 
are insignificant everywhere except in a small region in which they are negative.  Thus the 
conclusions from the main set of estimations are strengthened. 
In a seventh set of robustness tests, a difference in differences (D-D) approach is adopted 
as an alternative method to control for trends.  Since the treatment in the present context, G, is 
not binary, we split the counties into binary spending groups various ways.  First, counties are 
assigned a treatment variable T1 = 1 if the county was granted sustainable adoption money from 
at least one award apart from the single nationwide Sustainable Adoption grant.  Out of the 3,137 
counties in the sample, 1,711 are “treated” by this definition.  Second, T2 = 1 if T1 = 1 and the 
county received at least $0.58 per household.  This threshold is the amount of spending from the 
22-state project that results in the rightmost probability spike in the distribution of Sustainable 
Adoption spending shown in Figure 2.  In this regression, counties with intermediate spending 
levels are removed from the sample to differentiate more starkly the treated and untreated 
25 These are the observations created by prorating each project to its affected counties, before spending is summed 
over awards for each county. 
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 groups.  With this definition, 1,631 of the 3,057 counties remaining in the sample are treated.  
Finally, T3 = 1 if T1 = 1 and the county received more than $0.58 per household.  This definition 
is similar to the previous, except that counties covered only by the 22-state project are excluded 
from the sample, yielding the most differentiation between treated and control counties among 
these three D-D regressions. The results are in Table 13, which shows that none of the D-D 
coefficients are close to statistical significance, particularly for the BTOP definition of 
broadband.  Indeed, two of the six estimated D-D coefficients are negative.  Thus, we again 
conclude that controlling for trends removes the statistical significance of BTOP spending on 
broadband adoption. Furthermore, the D-D specification shows that this conclusion does not 
depend on the nonlinearity allowed in equation (3). 
VI. Implications and conclusion 
The empirical results lead to several implications for investigators attempting to evaluate 
BTOP and for policymakers.  First, the impact of the stimulus spending on broadband adoption 
is highly uncertain.  We did not find clear evidence supporting the position that BTOP led to 
beneficial outcomes of increased adoption. We addressed endogeneity with fixed-effects 
modeling and spurious correlation by controlling for trends.  However, in the end many of our 
results fall into the gray area between finding significant impacts of spending, at least in some 
ranges, when not accounting for trends and complete or greatly reduced lack of significance 
when accounting for trends.  With such a high degree of uncertainty in the results, no sweeping 
claims can be made for the success of BTOP as regards the goal of sustainable adoption. In fact, 




 How do the implied costs per residential fixed connection from our estimates compare 
with the figures from the NTIA’s evaluation of BTOP?  The only residential broadband 
subscription analysis in the NTIA’s report is for the Sustainable Adoption grants, where the 
average cost across all awards is $476 per household subscriber.26  The marginal costs per RFC 
from Sustainable Adoption spending derived from our estimations are reported in Table 9, and 
range from $40 to $116 from the estimations without controlling for trends.  Since NTIA’s 
estimate is based on a simple count of households served by grantee projects, without controlling 
for trends in adoption or any other counterfactual, these estimates based on equation (2) are the 
most comparable to the NTIA figure.  It is natural that our figures are lower than NTIA’s average 
cost per subscriber. Our estimates are marginal costs, and if there are some fixed costs in the 
BTOP projects marginal cost is likely lower than average cost.  However, our work above shows 
that it is important to control for trends in the analysis.  Controlling for trends, the point 
estimation for marginal cost per RFC balloons to $667 for the FCC definition of broadband and 
$8,611 for the BTOP definition (see the last two columns of Table 9).  Furthermore, given that 
the coefficients on Sustainable Adoption spending are insignificant in this latter regression, 
arbitrarily large marginal costs per subscriber cannot be ruled out on grounds of statistical 
insignificance.27  Thus the true costs of connecting households via BTOP may be greatly higher 
than NTIA’s estimate. 
Furthermore, it appears that the marginal impacts of the BTOP spending, at least in the 
aggregate, are neither linear nor even necessarily monotonic.  Thus, a second lesson for 
policymakers is to be suspicious of any policy evaluation of BTOP or other broadband-centric 
stimulus or digital inclusion initiative that assumes spending (or log spending) has constant 
26 The figure is apparently derived from the new subscribers each grantee claimed in its progress reports to NTIA. 
27 Put in the inverse way, the 95% confidence interval for the number of households connected with an extra dollar 
of sustainable adoption spending, which is [-0.0027,0.0029] for the estimation with trend, spans zero. 
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 returns.  The parallel lesson for empirical investigators is to avoid overly constraining the 
econometric specifications to yield (the perhaps “desired”) positive results.  If the only 
estimations we performed were those in Table 8 and Table 9, we would have missed important 
features of the data and been falsely optimistic about both the precision of the estimates and the 
direction of the impact of spending on broadband adoption. The work here demonstrates that the 
marginal effects on two measures of broadband adoption can be quite different at different 
spending levels.   
A third lesson for policymakers concerns the design of programs.  While it would have 
been possible to require awardees to submit projects that allowed for convincing evaluation of 
outcomes (e.g., randomized selection of participants, constructing and monitoring control 
groups, etc.), the NTIA did not do so.  Ignoring best practice in policy design and evaluation in 
this way violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the ARRA’s intent to provide accountability in 
spending.28  A full understanding of accountability requires assessing what society gained from 
the expenditure of public funds.  As the results above demonstrate, trying to recover the causal 
impacts of the spending on broadband and labor market outcomes proved difficult, due to the 
facts that every part of the country received at least some spending (at least in theory), there was 
no true control group, and the impacts appear to be impossible to distinguish from state-specific 
trends.   
The results suggest that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the outcomes of the 
specific programs.  A fruitful avenue for further investigation would be to evaluate individual 
28 The BTOP program took the narrowest approach to accountability, seeking to ensure only that money was spent 
as intended.  Grant recipients’ quarterly progress reports were made public in July 2014 (available at 
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/awards) and show little detail with respect to project implementation other than funds 
spent.  Recipients were not held accountable for successful project outcomes. For overall project evaluation NTIA 
paid ASR Analytics $5 million to study project success. As cited by Wallsten (2015), “ASR Analytics itself wrote 
that ‘The selection of grants [to be evaluated] was purposeful and not meant to yield a statistical sample.’ Yet, they 
used those very grants as the basis for the counties they studied statistically.”   
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 BTOP-funded projects, provided that an unbiased method for choosing projects to evaluate is 
used. Another extension would be to return to the evaluation once additional years of broadband 
adoption data are available, both to account for the few projects that had not been completed in 
2013 and to check for longer term effects of the BTOP spending.  Unless such future exploration 
of additional data yields strikingly different results, however, the case for the efficacy of BTOP 
for stimulating broadband adoption must remain weak. 
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Here we describe how we adapt existing methods for ordered logit estimation, with and without 
fixed effects, for our interval censored logistic regression problem.   
A. Interval censored logistic regression 
Examine first the case in which the latent data 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  are generated from equation (1), where 
εit is distributed logistic with scale parameter σ, and the observation rule for categories j = 0,…,5 
is  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗   if  ( 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 < 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1) ⇔ ( 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 < 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1) (4) 
(refer to Figure 3).  In the notation, γ from equation (1) is subsumed into β and the intercept α is 
written explicitly in equation (4).  It is understood that 𝜏𝜏0 = −∞  and 𝜏𝜏6 = ∞.  The likelihood of 
observing 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗 is then 
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗) = Λ�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎 � − Λ�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎 � (5) 
The cutpoints τ are known (0, 20, 40, 60, and 80). In the usual ordered logit case with unknown 
cutpoints, only 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎 and 𝜅𝜅𝑗𝑗 = �𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝛼𝛼�/𝜎𝜎, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5, are identified (as can be seen from 
examination of equation (5)).  Given that the τ are equidistant, so are the κ.  We thus first 
perform ordered logit estimation (using Stata 13.1) with the three linear constraints 𝜅𝜅2 − 𝜅𝜅1 =
𝜅𝜅3 − 𝜅𝜅2 = 𝜅𝜅4 − 𝜅𝜅3 = 𝜅𝜅5 − 𝜅𝜅4 to find estimates �𝛿𝛿, ?̂?𝜅�. Then the parameters of interest are 
recovered from the following rightmost equations:29  
𝜅𝜅2 − 𝜅𝜅1 = 𝜏𝜏2 − 𝜏𝜏1𝜎𝜎 = 20𝜎𝜎   ⇒   𝜎𝜎� = 20?̂?𝜅2 − ?̂?𝜅1 
𝜅𝜅1 = 𝜏𝜏1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜎𝜎 = −𝛼𝛼𝜎𝜎   ⇒   𝛼𝛼� = −𝜎𝜎�?̂?𝜅1 
29 The nlcom command in Stata 13.1 returns the estimates �𝛼𝛼� , ?̂?𝛽,𝜎𝜎�� and the associated asymptotic variance matrix.  
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 ?̂?𝛽 = 𝜎𝜎�𝛿𝛿 
B. Interval censored fixed effects logistic regression 
Baetschmann’s (2012) extension to Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann’s (2011) “blow up 
and cluster” (BUC) method for fixed effects ordered logit allows estimation when α in equation 
(4) is replaced with a unit-specific fixed effect αi.  The method estimates 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎 and 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 =
�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�/𝜎𝜎, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4.  As above, constraints are imposed in our estimation to enforce 
equidistant cutpoints:  𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗+1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,3.  From the estimates of �𝛿𝛿, ?̂?𝜆�, the parameters of 





 Figures and Tables 
Figure 1:  The distribution of total BTOP spending per household at the county level 
 



















0 2 4 6 8
BTOP Total Award Amount/HH, log
Note: Unit of observation is the county. Data include all funded projects and are constructed as
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Balled spikes represent discrete probability mass, estimated as fraction of sample. The rest
of the plotted distribution is a kernel density estimate.  See also notes to previous figure.
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 Figure 3:  Latent continuous RFC/HH and the observed categorical dependent variable 
 
 
Figure 4:  Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline 
regression 
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 Figure 5:  Marginal effects of Sustainable Adoption BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted 
cubic spline regression 
 





Figure 6:  Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline 
regression with trend 
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Figure 7:  Marginal effects of Sustainable Adoption BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted 
cubic spline regression with trend 
 




Figure 8: Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline 
regression, alternative sample 
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 Figure 9: Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline 
regression with trend, alternative sample 
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City 257 15.14 20 6.92 
County 128 7.54 20 6.92 
State 132 7.77 65 22.49 
Library 82 4.83 8 2.77 
University 176 10.37 30 10.38 
Tribal  27 1.59 6 2.08 
Others 896 52.77 140 48.44 









Table 2: Applicants by scope of recipients served. 










Multi-county   779 45.88 209 72.31 
Single-county 919 54.12 80 27.68 





 Table 3: Target groups by frequency of citations. 





Development 963 19.19 
Mapping 916 18.26 
Digital Literacy 887 17.68 
Youth 347 6.92 
Rural 299 5.96 
Public Safety 288 5.74 
Medical 245 4.88 
Partner with College 201 4.01 
Native American 198 3.95 
Minorities 130 2.59 
Small Businesses 119 2.37 
Public Housing 91 1.81 
Senior Citizens 85 1.69 
Disabled 59 1.18 
ESL 54 1.08 
Hispanic 40 0.80 
African American 21 0.42 
Asian 20 0.40 
Legal Services 14 0.28 
Agriculture 14 0.28 
Veterans Military 14 0.28 
Homeless 12 0.24 





























Infrastructure 397 23.38 123 42.56 3,729 3,484.4 93.44 
Public Computer 
Centers 638 37.57 65 22.49 200  200.5 100.25 
Sustainable 
Adoption 584 34.39 45 15.57 250  251.2 100.48 
State Data and 
Development 79 4.65 56 19.38 350  292.8 83.66 






 Table 5:  Applicant populations by socio-demographic characteristics. 
 
All Counties  Counties Covered by an Application 
 
Applied  Did Not Apply  Funded,  Denied, 
 




 p [pw] 
 p [pw] 
 p [pw] 
 p [pw] 
Black 0.102  0.123  0.044  0.106  0.083 
 
[0.136]  [0.160]  [0.072]  [0.140]  [0.109] 
Hispanic 0.077  0.089  0.076  0.076  0.078 
 
[0.168]  [0.271]  [0.072]  [0.173]  [0.129] 
Asian 0.012  0.017  0.010  0.012  0.010 
 
[0.051]  [0.076]  [0.019]  [0.054]  [0.032] 
American Indian 0.020  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.028 
 
[0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.011] 
Disabled 0.156  0.155  0.144  0.157  0.153 
 
[0.119]  [0.108]  [0.130]  [0.119]  [0.123] 
Veteran 0.112  0.107  0.115  0.111  0.114 
 
[0.094]  [0.074]  [0.111]  [0.092]  [0.112] 
Seniors 0.157  0.154  0.159  0.156  0.162 
 [0.133]  [0.125]  [0.141]  [0.132]  [0.140] 
Statistics are p, the simple average across counties of the proportion of the population in the group given in the header column, and 
[pw], the population-weighted average.  In columns headed “1 obs./County,” the statistics are based on the county as the unit of 
observation, so each county appears once in the calculations.  In columns headed “1 obs./Application,” the statistics are based on the 




 Table 6:  Categories for the dependent variable, residential fixed broadband connections per hundred households (RFC/HH) 











 Table 7:  Summary statistics of the data used in the regressions 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Outcomes, 2009     
 Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH) 
category, FCC definition (midyear) 2.859 0.842 1.000 5.000 
 Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH) 
category, BTOP definition (midyear) 2.439 0.913 0.000 5.000 
Outcomes, 2013     
 Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH) 
category, FCC definition (end of year) 3.555 0.787 1.000 5.000 
 Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH) 
category, BTOP def’n (beginning of yr) 3.211 0.836 1.000 5.000 
Total BTOP Award Amount/HH, log 2.878 1.554 -.345 8.526 
Sustainable Adoption BTOP Award 
Amount/HH, log -0.761 1.403 -2.036 5.482 
Control Variables     
 Population, log 10.260 1.464 4.078 16.111 
 Population change, 2000-09 4.168 14.159 -96.308 120.838 
 Projected population change, 2009-14 2.191 7.133 -100.000 28.169 
 Age less than 20 0.254 0.034 0.132 0.454 
 Age 65+ 0.157 0.039 0.028 0.361 
 Disabled 13.264 4.813 0.000 34.400 
 Veterans 11.239 2.835 0.000 27.788 
 Black 0.090 0.145 0.000 0.859 
 Native American 0.019 0.076 0.000 0.920 
 Asian 0.012 0.027 0.000 0.528 
 Multiracial 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.258 
 Hispanic 0.077 0.130 0.000 0.975 
 HH Income in $(25,50)K 0.318 0.037 0.148 0.471 
 HH Income in $ (50,75)K 0.177 0.040 0.057 0.311 
 HH Income in $ (75,100)K 0.073 0.032 0.002 0.237 
 HH Income in $ (100,150)K 0.042 0.029 0.000 0.252 
 HH Income > $150K 0.021 0.019 0.000 0.185 
 High School degree 0.346 0.067 0.107 0.532 
 College: Some or 2yr 0.262 0.057 0.088 0.450 
 College: 4 year+ 0.166 0.080 0.045 0.642 
 Establishment count per capita, log -3.815 0.371 -5.740 -1.376 
 CBSA: metropolitan 0.347 0.476 0.000 1.000 
 CBSA: micropolitan 0.220 0.414 0.000 1.000 
 Midwest region 0.336 0.473 0.000 1.000 
 South region 0.454 0.498 0.000 1.000 
 West region 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000 
Note: All data for covariates are for 2009 unless otherwise mentioned.  The statistics for the BTOP spending do not 




Table 8:  Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Linear Impact of BTOP Awards 
 Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying definition 
 FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  
Total BTOP Award 
Amount/HH, log 
2.600 2.921   




  3.732 3.920 
  (0.136)*** (0.149)*** 
Constant 48.533 50.351 61.423 66.189 
 (8.344)*** (9.501)*** (8.364)*** (9.645)*** 
Population, log 1.028 1.518 0.999 1.472 
 (0.235)*** (0.256)*** (0.234)*** (0.258)*** 
Population change, 
2000-09 
-0.028 0.001 -0.022 0.005 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
Projected population 
change, 2009-14 
0.020 0.054 0.015 0.054 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) 
Age less than 20 3.644 -9.417 1.386 -13.212 
 (10.572) (11.908) (10.450) (11.835) 
Age 65+ 25.016 19.384 13.931 4.418 
 (9.969)** (11.333)* (9.950) (11.546) 
Disabled -0.334 -0.369 -0.326 -0.354 
 (0.069)*** (0.075)*** (0.068)*** (0.074)*** 
Veterans 0.171 0.098 0.241 0.174 
 (0.107) (0.115) (0.104)** (0.114) 
Black -8.518 -7.001 -10.981 -9.789 
 (2.033)*** (2.168)*** (1.938)*** (2.061)*** 
Native American -1.752 -9.141 -6.617 -13.469 
 (3.487) (4.746)* (3.791)* (5.315)** 
Asian 31.259 29.928 10.905 9.150 
 (11.663)*** (16.112)* (12.070) (15.232) 
Multiracial -70.428 -70.035 -63.654 -62.807 
 (22.012)*** (25.451)*** (22.658)*** (27.300)** 
Hispanic -0.572 -2.550 -2.551 -4.773 
 (2.109) (2.201) (2.105) (2.160)** 
HH Income ∈ (25,50)K 3.942 -9.017 3.340 -11.416 
 (9.162) (10.351) (9.157) (10.382) 
HH Income ∈ (50,75)K 4.771 14.118 -3.790 2.952 
 (10.188) (11.230) (10.225) (11.345) 
HH Income ∈ (75,100)K 41.091 5.882 30.690 -5.457 
(20.054)** (22.583) (19.921) (22.938) 
Table continued next 
page 
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  Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying definition 
 FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  
HH Income ∈ 
(100,150)K 
8.839 9.963 18.614 23.553 
(24.928) (27.162) (24.951) (27.837) 
HH Income > 150K 67.366 70.114 55.171 54.312 
 (24.589)*** (26.147)*** (25.163)** (26.827)** 
High School degree 3.149 -12.886 6.373 -7.628 
 (6.826) (7.132)* (6.663) (6.938) 
College: Some or 2yr 32.610 37.276 28.500 33.707 
 (6.869)*** (7.057)*** (6.569)*** (6.869)*** 
College: 4 year+ 3.631 -3.123 10.013 3.344 
 (6.222) (7.053) (6.137) (7.056) 
Establishment count per 
capita, log 
4.209 3.922 4.036 3.984 
(0.827)*** (1.005)*** (0.833)*** (1.020)*** 
CBSA: metropolitan 1.055 1.735 0.736 1.322 
 (0.652) (0.687)** (0.658) (0.698)* 
CBSA: micropolitan 0.581 0.953 0.248 0.529 
 (0.536) (0.591) (0.524) (0.590) 
Midwest region -10.350 -10.607 -11.377 -11.762 
 (0.838)*** (0.818)*** (0.832)*** (0.840)*** 
South region -10.762 -10.840 -12.079 -12.268 
 (0.916)*** (0.891)*** (0.915)*** (0.914)*** 
West region -10.345 -12.378 -9.957 -11.884 
 (1.049)*** (1.103)*** (1.052)*** (1.115)*** 
σ (logistic scale 
parameter) 
7.902 8.558 8.040 8.806 
(0.096)*** (0.097)*** (0.097)*** (0.099)*** 
χ2 statistic 1,958.6 2,075.5 1,976.6 1,957.4 
χ2 degrees of freedom  27 27 27 27 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -7,042.4 -7,562.8 -7,128.1 -7,712.1 
N (observations) 6,272 6,272 6,272 6,272 
N (clusters = counties) 3,136 3,136 3,136 3,136 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes:  Regression specification is based on equation (1) in the text.  No fixed effects are 
included in these regressions.  Estimates are scaled so that coefficients are the marginal effects 
on the dependent variable (given in the column headings), where the latter is on a 100-point 
scale.  Estimation method is as described in section A of the appendix.  Figures in parentheses 
are estimated standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and account for clustering 




Table 9:  Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Linear Impact of BTOP Awards (Fixed Effects)  
 Y = 100 × Residential Fixed Broadband Connections/Household, varying definition 
 FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  
Total BTOP Award 
Amount/HH, log 
2.995 3.356       
(0.103)*** (0.104)***       
Sustainable Adoption BTOP 
Award Amount/HH, log 
  4.903 5.224 2.155 1.801 0.313 0.024 
  (0.182)*** (0.188)*** (0.268)*** (0.271)*** (0.289) (0.297) 
Non-Sustainable Adoption 
BTOP Award Amount/HH, log 
    2.000 2.508   
    (0.152)*** (0.155)***   
Year 2013       13.272 15.226 
       (0.713)*** (0.745)*** 
σ (logistic scale parameter) 8.167 8.479 8.377 8.868 8.086 8.429 7.839 8.203 
(0.142)*** (0.135)*** (0.138)*** (0.140)*** (0.137)*** (0.134)*** (0.135)*** (0.140)*** 
Marginal cost per RFC from 
Sustainable Adoption $$ 
  $42.53 $39.91 $96.76 $115.75 $667.03 $8,610.85 
χ2 statistic 668.6 798.9 634.7 645.2 747.3 842.1 825.8 845.0 
χ2 degrees of freedom 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -4,030.7 -4,652.4 -4,249.3 -5,078.5 -3,959.0 -4,600.9 -3,718.8 -4,332.7 
N (original observations) 6,234 6,268 6,234 6,268 6,234 6,268 6,234 6,268 
N (blown up observations)  49,816 77,280 49,816 77,280 49,816 77,280 49,816 77,280 
N (clusters = counties) 3,117 3,134 3,117 3,134 3,117 3,134 3,117 3,134 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes:  Regression specification is based on equation (2) in the text.  Marginal cost per residential fixed connection (RFC) is 
calculated from the coefficients for Sustainable Adoption spending, and is a household-weighted average across counties.  County 
fixed effects are included in these regressions.  Estimation method is as described in section B of the appendix.  See notes to previous 





Table 10:  Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Flexible Impact of Total BTOP Awards 
 Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying definition 
 FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  
Xtotal = Total BTOP 
Award Amount/HH, log 
8.230 8.552 9.068 4.919 
(0.542)*** (0.569)*** (3.336)*** (3.544) 
Xtotal, Spline variable 2 -127.812 -144.498 -138.566 -97.925 
 (29.062)*** (29.540)*** (52.785)*** (54.663)* 
Xtotal, Spline variable 3 404.143 468.051 433.017 343.019 
 (110.146)*** (111.747)*** (162.483)*** (166.680)** 
Xtotal, Spline variable 4 -444.089 -504.365 -468.504 -398.632 
 (144.488)*** (147.304)*** (176.817)*** (180.438)** 
Xtotal, Spline variable 5 365.986 271.211 379.366 213.136 
 (211.446)* (219.331) (218.570)* (226.071) 
Xtotal, Spline variable 6 -232.064 28.889 -242.552 74.638 
 (282.869) (293.484) (286.037) (296.388) 
Year 2013   -1.499 6.496 
   (5.741) (6.124) 
σ (logistic scale 
parameter) 
7.786 8.159 7.786 8.156 
(0.135)*** (0.142)*** (0.135)*** (0.141)*** 
χ2 statistic 887.6 896.1 888.3 904.6 
χ2 degrees of freedom 6 6 7 7 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -3,670.8 -4,278.5 -3,670.7 -4,276.7 
N (original observations) 6,234 6,268 6,234 6,268 
N (blown up 
observations) 
49,816 77,280 49,816 77,280 
N (clusters = counties) 3,117 3,134 3,117 3,134 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes:  Regression specification is based on equation (3) in the text, where f is estimated with 
restricted cubic splines.  County fixed effects are included in these regressions.  Seven spline 
knots were used.  Estimation method is as described in section B of the appendix.  See also notes 
to Table 8.  
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 Table 11: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Flexible Impact of Sustainable Adoption 
BTOP Awards 
 Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying definition 
 FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  
XSA = Sustainable 
Adoption BTOP Award 
Amount/HH, log 
13.939 15.843 -0.905 -1.521 
(0.704)*** (0.737)*** (1.794) (1.834) 
XSA, Spline variable 2 -233.862 -281.421 37.999 36.824 
 (25.202)*** (26.260)*** (39.029) (39.611) 
XSA, Spline variable 3 1,404.713 1,713.498 -265.225 -240.313 
 (171.774)*** (178.447)*** (250.170) (253.244) 
XSA, Spline variable 4 -1,276.846 -1,566.675 255.865 226.036 
 (164.122)*** (170.289)*** (233.783) (236.430) 
Year 2013   14.039 16.359 
   (1.541)*** (1.592)*** 
σ (logistic scale 
parameter) 
7.979 8.386 7.834 8.200 
(0.138)*** (0.142)*** (0.135)*** (0.140)*** 
χ2 statistic 754.6 782.2 838.5 851.9 
χ2 degrees of freedom 4 4 5 5 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -3,851.3 -4,524.3 -3,716.0 -4,331.0 
N (observations) 6,234 6,268 6,234 6,268 
N (observations) 49,816 77,280 49,816 77,280 
N (clusters = counties) 3,117 3,134 3,117 3,134 
Notes:  Regression specification is based on equation (3) in the text, where f is estimated with 
restricted cubic splines.  County fixed effects are included in these regressions.  Five spline knots 




 Table 12: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Linear Impact of BTOP Awards (Fixed Effects) – Alternative Spending Categories 
 Y = 100 × Residential Fixed Broadband Connections/Household, varying definition 
 FCC BTOP  FCC BTOP  
Sustainable Adoption BTOP 
Award Amount/HH, log 
3.420 3.278 1.069 0.859 
(0.237)*** (0.241)*** (0.273)*** (0.280)*** 
Infrastructure BTOP Award 
Amount/HH, log 
1.363 1.805 -0.175 0.229 
(0.144)*** (0.148)*** (0.179) (0.190) 
Other BTOP Award 
Amount/HH, log 
  2.334 2.416 
  (0.162)*** (0.173)*** 
σ (logistic scale parameter) 8.234 8.618 7.914 8.314 
(0.138)*** (0.136)*** (0.135)*** (0.139)*** 
χ2 statistic 698.9 782.0 805.9 869.5 
χ2 degrees of freedom 2 2 3 3 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -4,102.2 -4,809.1 -3,805.1 -4,460.7 
N (original observations) 6,234 6,268 6,234 6,268 
N (blown up observations)  49,816 77,280 49,816 77,280 
N (clusters = counties) 3,117 3,134 3,117 3,134 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes:  Regression specification is based on equation (2) in the text.  County fixed effects are included in these regressions.  




 Table 13: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Difference in Differences Specifications 
 Y = 100 × Residential Fixed Broadband Connections/Household, varying definition 
 Treatment Variable T1  Treatment Variable T2  Treatment Variable T3 
 FCC BTOP   FCC BTOP   FCC BTOP  
Difference-in-differences 
coefficient (T×Year2013) 
0.915 -0.017  0.888 -0.034  1.153 0.264 
(0.836) (0.868)  (0.841) (0.873)  (0.975) (0.999) 
Year 2013 13.385 15.282  13.377 15.278  13.376 15.280 
(0.618)*** (0.649)***  (0.618)*** (0.649)***  (0.617)*** (0.649)*** 
σ (logistic scale parameter) 7.838 8.203  7.796 8.170  7.787 8.187 
(0.135)*** (0.140)***  (0.134)*** (0.141)***  (0.151)*** (0.159)*** 
χ2 statistic 819.3 840.4  821.7 831.9  622.6 653.1 
χ2 degrees of freedom 2 2  2 2  2 2 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -3,718.7 -4,332.7  -3,602.6 -4,203.9  -2,753.3 -3,243.4 
N (original observations) 6,234 6,268  6,078 6,108  4,664 4,684 
N (blown up observations)  49,816 77,280  48,644 75,450  37,284 57,818 
N (clusters = counties) 3,117 3,134  3,039 3,054  2,332 2,342 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes:  Regression specification is difference in differences, with treatment group indicated in the column heading (which are 
described in the text).  County fixed effects are included in these regressions.  Estimation method is as described in section B of the 
appendix.  See notes to Table 8 regarding scaling of coefficients and s.e.’s. 
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